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Introduction
A growing literature corroborates the principal refutable implications of transaction cost analysis (TCA). These include investigations of vertical integration of distribution, sales compensation practices, component procurement and the like(seeWilliamson, 1989,forareviewof therecentempiricalwork). However, enforceable, nor do royalty agreements have to be crafted between these two firms. It encompasses those cases where the focal firm implicitly licenses firms by not mounting legal challenges to firms that sell "cloned" or reverseengineeredproducts. Forinstance, neitherIBMnorMicrosoftformaly licensed their MS-DOS/PC-DOS operating system for personal computers to Novell (Digital Research). Yet, Novell sells a "clone" product called DR-DOS without being legally challenged by the original firms. These products compete with each other in the marketplace. The critical features of this type of licensing can be summarized as follows. First, the licensed and original products are functionally similar enough such. that switching costs across them are minimal on repeat-purchase occasions. Second, the two firms must be competing with each other for customers, and thus excludes cases where one firm sells the product in markets that are not served by the other firm.
Predicted Price Paths
Farrell and Gallini (1988) and Dutta (1990) show that the credible price path for a monopolist involves price hikes in follow-on periods commensurate with buyers' first-period specific investments (P2 = Pl + I). With a second firm present, the credible price paths involve identical prices over the two periods regardless of specific investments (P2 = PI).
Predicted Profits
In general terms, the attractiveness of inviting competition from licensees reflects a trade-off between the need to craft an efficient safeguard (market enlargement effect) and the erosion of a valuable monopoly position. We focus on two specific predictions. Farrell and Gallini (1988) and Dutta (1990) show that 8(n2 -nl)/al > 0.
As buyers' specific investments (I) increase, the difference in profits to the firm between introducing another firm (12) and going it alone (Hi) increases correspondingly. The intuition is that buyers are reluctant to incur specific investments that they know will be exploited ex post Higher levels of such investments deter ever larger numbers of potential buyers. By introducing a second firm, these skeptical buyers are reassured, and the market is enlarged as a consequence. Although the licensor benefits from the enlarged market, there is also an erosion of the monopoly position. The market enlargement effect is more pronounced at higher levels of specific assets, and dominates the monopoly erosion effect at sufficiently high levels of these investments. Notice that the difference in profits itself (12 -HI ) can be positive or negative depending on the specific values of the parameters. A related result from these two studies is that a(n2 -rl)/ V < 0, that is, the relative profitability of introducing another firm (I12) as compared to going italone (1H) is reduced as the economic value (V) of the focal item is increased.
When the purchased item in question can significantly increase the value of the buyers' own end product, they are willing to tolerate price hikes that exploit their locked-in condition. Thus, fewer buyers need to be reassured, and the market enlargement effect is smaller. The net effect is to render licensing less attractive to the licensor, all else equal. As before, note that the actual difference in profits between the two options may be positive or negative depending on the magnitudes of the parameters.
Study I: Experimental Market Study 3.1 Preliminary Considerations
An experimental market offers better internal validity because we can probe the presumed theoretical mechanisms more directly. In the extant case, evidence about the price paths enables us to rule out alternative explanations that have been offered for licensing, including commitment to quality levels (Shepard, 1987b) , "network externality" effects (Katz and Shapiro, 1985) , and preemption of rivalry (Gallini, 1984) . In contrast, matching up licensing decisions with attributes of the transaction does not enable a clear separation of these explanations.
A concern voiced about experimental markets is their apparent lack of external validity. Clearly, a lab setting is quite far removed from the "real marketplace" of firms and managers. However, these concerns often represent a misunderstanding of the design of these studies. In speaking to this issue, Smith (1982: 936) notes that "propositions about the behavior of individuals and the performance of institutions that have been tested in the laboratory ... apply also to nonlaboratory microeconomies where similar ceteris paribus conditions hold." Likewise, Plott (1989 Plott ( : 1165 notes "the simplicity of laboratory markets in comparison with naturally occurring markets must not be confused with questions about their reality as markets."
These remarks clarify the burden on the experimenter. A proper lab test of a theorymustimplementthecriticalfeaturesofthe theory. Asuperficial similarity between the lab setting and the real world is not the issue. Applying this criterion, we note that the core of our theory deals with economically motivated behavior given a specific structure of exchange. Thus, to ensure the validity of our lab market, our procedures must ensure economically motivated behavior in a setting where vertical integration and long-term contracts do not exist, and arm's-length, price-mediated exchange occurs.1 Within this context, we need to implement specific investments, and the other parameters of the model.
The Experimental Market Setting
Our subjects played the role of suppliers of electrical transformers purchased by original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) of electrical generating equipment. Subjects could sell these transformers to the OEMs, who then used the 1. For an interesting experimental market study that looks at the efficacy of relational contracting versus vertical integration under varying informational conditions, see Hackett, Wiggins, and Battalio, 1993. item in their own end product (an electrical generator). By incorporating the transformer, OEMs added value to their own end product. However, in order to utilize the transformer in their end product, the OEMs had to spend money developing a control panel that was specific to the transformer from a given supplier (or its licensee, if present).
We recruited undergraduate business students with a monetary inducement They were told they could keep the money earned in the study. On average, subjects made $7.10 for about 50 minutes of work, including the time it took to receive instructions. This is within the range of wages typically earned by these students. Post-study briefings supported our contention that these amounts were sufficient to motivate them monetarily.
One aspect of this inducement should be noted. Since the different experimental conditions do not afford all subjects the opportunity to earn like amounts of money, equity concerns could influence their behavior and contaminate the study. To minimize this possibility, we rely on an established procedure, whereby our subjects earned profits in experimental currency units (francs) that were converted to dollars using individual exchange rates. This created opportunities to take home comparable sums of money. These individual exchange rates (ranging from 90 to 350 francs to a dollar) were not made public knowledge, so as to minimize interpersonal comparisons.
Notice that experimental realism in our study does not depend on our subjects' expertise about the licensing practices of industrial firms. To the contrary, "demand artifacts" are reduced by the lack of such knowledge because of less hypothesis guessing. However, this is nottrue of all potential hypotheses. Consider the hypothesis that firms are more likely to introduce a competitor when required to reassure buyers making specific investments. Indeed, this is the type of hypothesis most often tested in extant studies. This hypothesis would require subjects who have some reasonable familiarity with the institutional details of implementing a license arrangement, and thus would probably not be a good candidate for a laboratory market using student subjects. In fact, we consider such a hypothesis later, and turn to a standard design using industry data to test it
Experimental Design
The study used a four-factor (2 x 2 x 2 x 2), "mixed" design, consisting of three between-subject factors and one within-subject factor.
Number of Suppliers (S)
. This between-subjects factor was operationalized as thenumberof suppliers, viz. one supplier (S1) or a licensorandalicensee (S2)2 In the latter case, the first firm was told that they had licensed another 2. The underlying model for the market experiment is a location model where the licensor and licensee are fixed at opposite ends of a unit line. Some differentiation between the two suppliers is essential for the results to hold. If the two suppliers were located at the same point, the complete erosion of the monopoly position renders it unprofitable ever to introduce a licensee. Only delayed licensing can be profitable. We disregarded delayed licensing as a plausible implicit contract because of the obvious enforcement problems it poses. It is possible for the two suppliers to locate at firm to produce and sell the transformer. The second firm had to pay a royalty fee of 10 percent on sales to the first firm.3 3.3.2 Specific Investments (). This between-subjects factor was operationalized as a one-time cost that buyers incurred for developing the control panel needed to use the transformer. This panel could be used either with the transformer sourced from the first firm or with the transformer from the second firm, if one existed. Subsequent purchases from either supplier did not require them to re-incur this expenditure to capture the sunk cost condition of specific investments. The two levels of these costs represented the low (II = 60) and high (12 = 90) specific investment conditions.
Economic Value (V)
. This between-subjects factor was operationalized as the increase in unit selling price realized by buyers who incorporate the transformer into their electrical generator end product. A low value (Vi = 100) and a high value (V2 = 120) were manipulated as two levels of this factor.
Time Period (T)
. This within-subject factor was operationalized as the initial (TI) and follow-on (T2) time periods.
Procedure
A total of 120 subjects were randomly assigned to one of the eight betweensubjects conditions. Since the duopoly conditions required twice as many subjects, the assignment procedure reflected this requirement. This yielded 10 observations per cell.
3.4.1 Instructions to Subjects. Each subject was given an instruction packet that varied across conditions to reflect the differences in their circumstances. In the monopoly conditions, buyers could buy only from the monopolist In the duopoly conditions, the packet informed the subjects that they were one of two firms. The firm located in California had already licensed their proprietary product to the firm that was located in New York. In return, the licensee was required to pay 10 percent of revenues to the licensor.
Appendix 1 illustrates the transportation cost differences between the buyers. We set up these differences to implement the location model in Dutta (1990) . Imagine these 12 buyers located at equal intervals along a road with a supplier at each end. Two buyers were located at the mid-point, such that if both suppliers quoted the same price, they each sold to one of these two buyers. Buyers closer to a firm will prefer to buy from that firm.
3.4.3 Subjects' Decisions. The packets informed the subjects that they would have the opportunity to make sales to these 12 buyers for two consecutive time periods. They were required to post their selling price in each time period, and sell to all interested buyers at that price. No bargaining or other communication with buyers was allowed. Each subject was seated in a room alone. After reading the instructions, the subjects were given time to consider their price for the first time period. When they announced their asking price, the experimenter left the room to inform the buyers of the price, and then returned with purchase orders from the buyers who had elected to purchase the item. These purchase orders contained information on orders by specific buyers, and revenues. In the duopoly conditions, subjects were provided with data on their own prices, orders, and revenues as well as these data for the other firm. No direct communication between the two firms was permitted.
After being allowed to inspect the first-period outcomes, the subjects were asked to post their selling price for the second period. Following the same routine, the experimenter took the prices to another room, and returned with purchase orders for the second time period. Second-period market shares and revenues were reported back to the subjects.
Market
Response. Unknown to the subjects, a confederate played the role of the 12 buyers. The confederate applied a formula-based decision rule for each buyer, which operationalized expected prices and costs over the relevant horizon. Described in Appendix 2, this formula computes the net gain for each buyer by comparing the economic value of the item against the sum of the announced first-period price, the expected second-period price, and the transportation cost for each of the possible sources of supply. The result determined the purchase outcome for each buyer. This was repeated for each period, except that there was no relevant future period in the second period.
Price Path Hypotheses
Recall that monopolists should increase second-period prices to take advantage of locked-in buyers.4 In contrast, the duopolists will be unable to raise prices in the second period. Using the first firm's prices as the dependent variable, our data should show a T x S interaction effect between time period and number of suppliers.
Profit Hypotheses
Recall that higher specific investment levels made licensing relatively more attractive. Using the total two-period profits of the first firm as the dependent variable, our data should show a two-way interaction (S x I) between the number of supplying firms (S) and the level of specific investments (I). The second profit prediction held that licensing a competitor becomes increasingly less profitable as the value of the item to the buyers increases. We should observe a two-way interaction (S x V) between the number of supplying firms (S) and the economic value of the item to the buyers (V).
Results

Price Path Results
The dependent variable is the price charged by the first firm. Figures 1 and 2 show the prices charged by the lab subjects. Evidently, the monopolist subjects increased prices, while no such pattern is evident in the duopoly conditions. To test the expected S x T interaction, we estimated a repeated-measures, analysis of variance (ANOVA) model with three between-subjects factors (S, I, V), and one within-subject factor (T). The results are summarized in Table 1 . As expected, we see a strong S x T interaction (F(1, 72) = 332.9, p < .00). 
Combining Lab Experiments and Industry Data
Profit Results
The profits of the first firm in the different conditions are shown in Figure 3 . To test the hypotheses, we estimated an analysis of variance model. Unlike the previous model, this is a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects design. Since the dependent measure is the total profit summed over the two periods (Ti and T2), the within-subject factor, T, is no longer relevant. Table 2 shows the analysis of varianceresults for these data. Asperourfirsthypothesis, wefind a strong Sx I interaction (F(1, 72) = 30.4, p < .00). The difference in profits (n2 -rI) increasingly favors the two-firm option as specific investments increase. From Notice, however, that the absolute level of profit nevertheless favors the monopoly option at both levels of I averaged across V. This is still consistent with the theory. To recall, the sign of the profit difference depends on the magnitudes of the parameters. 'Tming to the second profit prediction, as expected, there is a significant S x V interaction (F(I, 72) = 31.5, p < .00) in Table 2 
Additional Analysis
4.3.1 Reneging on Implicit Contracts. The strength of a theory testcorresponds to the opportunity for disconfirmation that is afforded by the design. Applying that criterion to our lab study, we need to ask whether the manipulations and procedures afford -the opportunity to disconfirm the prediction that a second firn's presence will hold down opportunistic price hikes. Could our subjects have gained by deviating from the theoretically correct behavior? Does the setting so tightly constrain plausible courses of action that a subject is merely following instructions rather than acting on his or her own motivation to earn money? Our experimental design offered duopolist subjects the possibility of significant gains by deviating from the predicted subgame perfect behavior. Suppose, for instance, that the duopolists were to renege on their implicit contract in the second period. Our subjects could have raised second-period prices to the point where buyers' net economic value goes to zero without sacrificing the enlargement effect Consider, for instance, a simple pricing rule whereby subjects set second-period prices as equal to announced first-period prices plus the amount of the specific investment (I) made by buyers. Such a rule would have yielded the subjects about twice as much money as they earned from the predicted Nash behavior? 7. We are not offering a full-blown alternative ex ante hypothesis. Rather, the strength of the design is being assessed.
If our subjects had deviated from thepredicted pattern in this fashion, then the statistical analysis of the price data in Table 1 should show only a main effect of timeperiod (T) on the price dependent variable, and not the T x S interaction of time period with number of supplying firms. Table 1 confirms ourposition that the safeguard worked to hold down prices despite this potential for reneging. Indeed, the data do show a significant main effect of T (F(1, 72) = 304.5, p < .00), but the T x S interaction is also significant (F(1, 72) = 332.9, p < .00).8 The latter refutes the reneging idea. Apparently, the safeguard was strong enough to overcome this possibility.
Closeness of Fit to Subgame Perfect
Predictions. Laboratory experiments have often found that subjects deviate from individual utility-maximizing behavior predicted by game-theoretic models. Some subjects appear to act out of "fairess" or consideration for others (for an extended discussion of this issue in lab experiments, see Hoffman and Spitzer, 1982) . If this were widespread, it weakens the need to rely on invited competition to hold down price hikes on locked-in buyers. We tested this possibility in our data.
Figures 1 and 2 plot the predictions made from the game-theoretic analysis in Farrell and Gallini (1988) and Dutta (1990) . In their models, the secondperiod price charged by monopolistic suppliers should be exactly equal to the first-period price plus the specific investment of the buyer (I). Suppliers are completely opportunistic and appropriate the full value of the buyers' specific investments. Figures 1 and 2 show the prices quoted by monopolistic subjects. Secondperiod prices are indeed higher than first-period prices. They are not significantly different from the predicted second-period price at the 95 percent level. However, a number of subjects did price considerably lower than the predicted price. Using a nonparametric sign test to assess this, we find a significant number of monopolist subjects quoted prices lower than the predicted second-period price. This is particularly evident in the low-value/high-sunk-cost cells. These subjects were not fully opportunistic. Consistent with past findings, some degree of "fairess" orforbearance was present. In contrast, the duopolist subjects do not show any systematic deviation across the possible comparisons of actual and predicted prices. Overall, these deviations from the subgame perfect predictions do not appear widespread enough to obviate the need for invited competition to hold down price hikes on locked-in customers.
Summary
Overall, these results provide good support for the predictions. Introducing a licensee attenuates opportunistic price hikes, and leads to profit outcomes consistent with the theory. Although forbearance is exhibited to some degree by monopolist suppliers facing locked-in customers, the game-theoretic anal-8. Although we point out the "significant" main effect, its interpretation is ambiguous in the presence of a significant interaction effect Microprocessors are "computers on a chip." As such, their use involves a heavy commitment of resources to design hardware and software around the specific requirements of the particular microprocessor. For instance, it has been estimated that the choice of any particular 16-bit microprocessor family in a system is usually a 5-to 10-year commitment to that family and will entail an investment of $10 million to $20 million (Electronic Neivs, 1980). Further, this investment is not recoverable in the event that the firm switches to another microprocessor. The software and support chips are specific to each microprocessor. In contrast, memory devices require much lower levels of supplier-specific investment. Relatively little redesign work has to be undertaken to substitute another vendor's memory device in the end product.
There are a large number of other types of semiconductor devices, such as application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) and logic chips. These devices fall somewhere between memory devices and microprocessors in terms of their complexity. However, these other categories are very diverse, and it is difficult to characterize the relative level of specific investments associated with them. Thus, we confine our analysis to devices at the extreme ends of this continuum, viz. microprocessors and memory devices. We constructed a dummy variable, DEVICE, coded 0 for memory devices and I for microprocessor devices, to classify components from these two categories listed in the handbook.
Dependent Variable. The dependent variable is the licensing decision.
Since de facto licensing and formal contracts are not distinguished in the theory, we cannot rely on Shepard's approach (1987a) of content analyzing published accounts of licensing contracts to derive our measure. Instead, our measure relies on the presence or absence of functionally equivalent products from firms other than the firm that originated the product.
To accomplish this, we capitalize on the DATA handbook's assignment of a unique generic part number to all the devices that it lists as interoperable. This generic part number is in addition to the vendor-specific part number attached to the item. The handbook defines interoperability as the ability of users to substitute devices with the same generic part number regardless of the vendor-specific part number without incurring any significant redesign or other engineering switchover cost. Interviews with technical personnel at two major semiconductor user firms confirmed the validity of the handbook's assignment of generic part numbers and the interoperability of devices listed as such. We constructed a measure, NFIRMS, coded as 1 when devices from multiple vendors were listed for a given generic part number and 0 when a single vendor was listed for a given generic part number. We reemphasize that the presence of multiple vendors for a given generic part number does not imply that formal licenses have been granted. The item might simply have been "cloned" or reverse-engineered.
Results.
Recall the prediction is that microprocessors will be available from multiple vendors more often as compared to memory devices. Table 3 tabulates the DATA handbook information in these respects.
There are 2,444 individual generic part numbers assigned to microprocessors and memory devices. Among the 238 generic part numbers in the microprocessor category, 32 percent of them have more than one firm listed as offering that item. In contrast, among the 2,206 generic part numbers in the memory device category, 14.6 percent of them have more than one firm listed as offering that item. Microprocessors are more than twice as likely to have multiple vendors selling interoperable items compared to memory devices. A chi-square test shows that the proportion of microprocessors with multiple sources is significantly higher than the proportion for memory devices (X2(1) = 49.587, p < .05).
Establishing this association does not allow us to disentangle the safeguarding interpretation from other explanations, such as network exteralities or improved delivery-time commitment It is plausible to suppose that network externality effects are greater for microprocessors than memory devices. This could account for our results. However, the combination of the lab data and the industry data constitute more robust evidence about licensing as a safeguard, by including evidence on the price paths, subsequent profits, as well as the actual behavior of firms. Taken together, these are not consistent with the other explanations.
Conclusions and Limitations
'Io complementary studies have been presented to test the contention that "invited" competition is a safeguard for buyers' specific investments. The specific institutional mechanism to implement this safeguard was the introduction of a licensee as a competitor. Below, we expand on the substantive and methodological implications of our work.
The Economics of Safeguards
The fundamental economic issue addressed here concerns the means by which firms committo nonopportunistic behaviorex post. Traditionally, TCA work on this issue has focused on efficiency gains from crafting appropriate safeguards. While our work is in this tradition, it exposes the importance of the trade-off between monopoly rents and efficiency. Notice that our monopolist firm faces a trade-off between enlargement of the market and erosion of monopoly rents.
In Figure 3 , we see that for sufficiently high economic value, the introduction of the licensee leaves the monopolist worse off regardless of the level of sunk costs. The erosion of rents is simply not offset enough by market enlargement. This trade-off is beginning to be explicitly considered in the literature. Helper and Levine (1992) offer a model of industrial buyers with large monopoly rents who sacrifice efficient relationships with suppliers on account of this trade-off. However, apart from the present data, there is no empirical evidence on these matters. Hopefully, future work will pick up on these issues, and begin to redress the growing imbalance between theoretical accounts and evidence.
One line of inquiry prompted by our results would be to use different implementations of the incumbent's monopoly position. In order to be faithful to the spatial location model in Dutta (1990) , our firms do not choose location(s) endogenously. More complex formulations are possible, including endogenous location choice, entry, and the like. We know from existing analytic models that their predictions are quite sensitive to their specific structure. Are our lab results robust across these other formulations?
Methodological Implications
Experimental markets offer considerable promise for assessing TCA predictions. The dominant methodological tool for empirical work in TCA has been the cross-sectional industry questionnaire and/or archival data. As our own results demonstrate, the lab can complement the traditional approach. It enables us to work directly with the causal mechanisms, and disentangle alternative explanations. Some specific suggestions for future studies can be gleaned from our experience. To begin, experimental markets are better suited for assessing subtle multiperiod effects like the opportunistic pricing behavior studied in our experiment. It is extraordinarily difficult to get industry data on multiperiod phenomena. Other multiperiod mechanisms are prominent in the TCA literature and could be studied with this approach. For instance, the Klein and Leffler (1981) repeatpurchase mechanism is widely cited in TCA models, but has never been subjected to empirical verification.
Of course, the precision and control afforded by market experiments also incurs somecosts. Aprominentdisadvantageisthattheimplementedconstructs are fairly narrow in scope. For instance, specific investments were implemented as the one-time dollar costs of adapting the purchased component into the end product. This does not capture other interpretations of the construct, such as social asset specificity or learning by doing. Likewise, opportunism is also defined narrowly as price hikes which exploit locked-in buyers. Other forms of opportunism such as delivery-time delays, quality shading, or perfunctory compliance were not implemented. Each of these interpretations need to be implemented in separate studies. We caution that a laboratory market with "noisy" implementations that combine multiple interpretations would be selfdefeating.
A subtler limitation of market experiments is more difficult to overcome.
Recall that our subjects did not require any knowledge of the institutional features of licensing beyond that provided in the instructions. However, this is not always the case. If the hypothesis being investigated involves a choice between institutional alternatives (e.g., outsourcing versus internal production), then the instruction task is more difficult. Indeed, it may not be possible to acquaint lab subjects sufficiently to implement these decisions in experimental markets. Experimental market researchers have spent a good deal of effort sorting through these issues (see Plott, 1989 , for an extended discussion), and future research must pay close attention to these discussions.
Appendix 1: Sample Instructions to Subjects
The instructions to the subjects are reproduced here. The "General Introduction" was seen by all subjects. The "Market Description" varied according to the role of the subject; we show the text provided to licensors. The description of "Your Tasks in the Experiment" also varied depending on whether a licensee was present; we show the text provided to the duopolist subjects. The "Market Characteristics" tables (Tables A.1 and A.2) also varied by subject. We show the tables for subjects in the condition with high economic value (V2), low specific investments (II), and two suppliers (S2).
A1.1 General Introduction
Welcome to this experiment As a participant in this experiment you will act as a seller of a product. You will be given a description of the market, i.e., a description of the buyers and the other seller. Your role as a seller will be to quote a price given the market description. Based on the price you quote you will make some profit (i.e., price times the number of buyers who buy from you). Your profit level will depend on how appropriately you price the product after you have read the market description. You will bepaid,according to the profits you make. So please read the following market description and the specific task description carefully because you can make more money if you quote an appropriate price. You will participate in a number of markets with similar characteristics as practice runs (i.e., six practice runs). After the practice runs you will get to play for real money. The amount you will get at the end of the experiment will be the total profit you make in all the markets you play for real money. The currency in these markets is francs. You will be paid in dollars. Each dollar is worth 100 francs to you. Note: After reading the following market description and then the task description, if you have any clarifications please ask the experimenter before you start quoting prices in the different markets.
A .2 Market Description
YourFirm: You are one of the two suppliers of a type of transformer and located in California. The other supplier is a firm whom you have licensed to produce the same type of transformer and from whom you charge a royalty of 10% on his unit selling price. Your licensee is located in New York. Both you and Similarity Across Buyers: All the buyers have the same economic value for the product they buy from you or from your licensee.
What is economic value? Roughly speaking it is the additional money they make by using your product or your licensee's. More precisely, the buyer's economic value is defined as the increase in unit selling price for the generator that the buyer receives as a result of incorporating your transformer or that of your licensee.
All the buyers also incur the same initial development cost in period 1 to develop the control panel before they can use either your product or that of your licensee.
Differences Across Buyers: The buyers are located in different parts of the country and they incur different transportation costs whether they purchase the product from you or your licensee.
Buyers' Initial Purchase Decision: The buyers will decide to purchase the product initially only if their expected net value for the product exceeds zero.
What is expected net value? Expected net value is defined as the buyers' economic value for the product over the two periods, minus their initial control panel development cost, the transportation cost incurred by them when they buy in the firstperiod, the transportation cost incurred by them again when they buy in the second period, the price you or the licensee quote in the first period, and the price the buyers expect you or the licensee to quote in the second period. They expect competition between the two suppliers to keep down any price hike in the second period.
Who will the buyers buy from initially? The buyers will buy from the supplier from whom they get a higher expected net value. What is second-period net value? Second-period net value is defined as the buyers' economic value for the product in the second period minus the transportation cost he incurs when he buys either from you or your licensee and the price quoted by you or the licensee in the second period.
Who will the buyers buy from in the second period? The buyers will buy from the supplier who gives them a higher second-period net value. 2. You will play six practice runs in six different markets which have similar characteristics. 3. After the practice runs you will play for real money in a number of markets which are similar to the ones you have encountered earlier.
Appendix 2: Decision Rules for Buyers A2.1 Robot Buyers Our buyers are "robots" that employ a decision rule based on Dutta (1990) and Farrell and Gallini (1988) . In their models, buyers are atomistic price takers, although they do take into account the supplier's likely pricing behavior. Critically, there is no strategic bargaining. In this respect, past experiments have found that when subjects become aware that their trading partners are making large profits in comparison to them, strategic bargaining behavior is induced. Subjects will forgo trade to drive prices down, rather than take smaller profits (Smith, 1980 
A2.2 Buyers' First-Period Purchase Decision Rule
A purchase occurs if and only if the buyer's net gain over the relevant horizon is positive. For a first-period purchase, this horizon consists of two periods. The formula for the ith buyer in the monopolist conditions is 2V -2CZi -P1 -E(P2) -I. Here, V is the economic value in use of the product, CZi is the transportation cost incurred by buyer i for each purchase, PI is the announced first-period price and I is the first-period sunk investment E(P2) is the expected second-period price, and is set equal to Pl + I. This is based on the two theoretical studies cited above. In the duopoly conditions, the same formula is used, except that the purchase will be made from the supplier who offers the greater expected positive net value. The formula compares the gain of (2V-2CZi I -Pll -E(P12) -I) for a purchase from the licensor, with a gain of (2V -2CZi -P21 -E(P2) -I) for a purchase from the licensee. Note the transportation cost and prices are different for each of the two suppliers. Here, CZil is buyer i's transportation cost from the first firm's plant, and CZi2 is the transportation cost from the second firm's plant P11{P21} is the announced first-period price of the first (second} firm. E(P12)[E(Pa)} is the expected second-period price of the first (second) firm. Unlike the monopoly case, these second-period prices are set equal to their announced first-period price (E(P12) = Pit and E(Pz2) = P21), as per the theoretical studies cited.
A2.3 Buyers' Second-Period Purchase Decision Rule
Here, the relevant horizon is just one period, and a purchase occurs if and only if that buyer's net value is greater than or equal to zero. In the monopolist conditions, purchases occur if V -CZi -Pi > 0. Notice the absence of a new set-up cost here. For the duopoly conditions, the supplier offering the greater positive net value will be selected (i.e., V -CZiI -P12 from the first firm is compared to V -CZi2 -P22 from the second firm). P12 and P22 are the announced second-period prices of the first and second firms, respectively.
A2.4 Cover Story
Although a confederate played the role of the 12 buyers and applied the formula derived above, the subjects were told that buyers were in another room making their purchase decisions. In post-study briefings, we did not find that subjects guessed the presence of formula-based rather than live buyers. Such cover stories are uncommon in experimental markets, but are the norm in social psychology experiments. We used the cover story to minimize potential demand characteristics. This term refers to aspects of a study's design and procedures that might lead the subject to guess the hypotheses under study, and result in subjects behaving in a manner that they think is consistent with the experimenter's wishes. In offering a social psychologist's critique of experimental economics studies, Kahneman (1988) notes that the lack of cover stories renders demand characteristics a real possibility, and suggests that experimental economists need to pay more attention to this issue. Our cover story minimizes the possibility that subjects would guess the wishes of the experimenter.
